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LEGAL BACKGROUND AND AFTERMATH-KENT STATE

S

The Legal Background and Aftermath of
the Kent State Tragedy
David E. Engdahl*

E VENTS OF TRAGIC VIOLENCE OCCUR WITH SUCH COMMONNESS

TODAY

that they are greeted most frequently either with a callous indifference or a generalized despair. Yet to thoughtful observers, there
is an essential difference between those tragedies attributable to extremist and criminal factions, and those which result from overbearing acts of the agents of government themselves. Jackson State
and Attica are only two of the most recent examples of events that
test the strength of our modern commitment to the standards of
government behavior our heritage had led us to expect. Even among
the recent instances of tragic government violence, however, the sustained military rifle barrage against unarmed students scores of
yards away, which took place at Kent State University on May 4,
1970, holds a singular place. Kent State has already become, and will
long remain, a more poignant and significant recollection than any
other single incident in our recent national life.
The reason for its singular significance is not the number of
persons killed and crippled or otherwise wounded by the shooting at
Kent, although for those personally touched by the tragedy its effect
is especially profound. What is most significant about Kent State is
that it confronts us squarely with some of the very issues and values
that gave this nation birth. The parallel between Kent State in 1970
and the tragic "massacre" in colonial Boston exactly two hundred
years before is a compelling and disturbing one. It is instructive to
review some features of our history, for centuries even before the
settlement of this continent began, bearing in mind the familiar
precept that a rule which reflection upon the historic institutions
and values of Anglo-American law discloses to be fundamental, must
be recognized as essential to due process of law.1
The Legal Background
Almost from the time when Henry II in the year 1181 first ordered
that all free men in England were to be sworn to arms, English law
drew a distinction between how armed force was to be used in peace
and in war. As a force for defense of the realm in case of war, these
armed men - the jurata ad arma - were placed under the control
of military officials and governed by rules of law outside the scope
of the common law, administered by the Court of the Constable and
*LL.B., University of Kansas; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Member of the Michigan and

Colorado Bars; Associate Professor University of Colorado School of Law.
1Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Marshal, a prerogative tribunal. As a force for the arrest of malefactors and for the suppression of domestic unrest and disorder these
same jurata ad arma were placed under the control of the sheriffs in
their respective counties and governed, like the sheriffs, by the rules
of the fledgling common law. Thus the same body of armed men constituted at once the mititia and the posse comitatus, the essential distinctions between the two forces being the officers who had control
2
over them and the rules of law to which they were subject.
The crucial distinction between governing the realm in accordance with reasoned rules of law and governing by sheer force and
prerogative was recognized when King John by Magna Carta prom3
ised to deal with his nobles in accordance with "the law of the land."
the
by
as
authority
taken
was
pledge
In the fourteenth century that
Parliament for holding that it was unlawful for the King to seize
traitors and try them and execute them for treason by military
process; so long as the common law courts were open and able to
function, to proceed by military process was to derogate from "the
law of the land."4 When the jurata ad arma rose up to suppress the
Peasant's Revolts of 1381, using measures of force more appropriate to their role as a military force than to their role as the posse
comitatus, the common law would have punished them for their overzealous restoration of order if King Richard II had not extended his
pardon to them for suppressing and punishing the rioters "sanz due
due process of law. 5
proces de loye" -without
The first English riot act was enacted in 1411. In accordance with
what had already become tradition, it provided for suppression of
riots by the posse comitatus under the command of civil officers and
6
made no provision whatsoever for military intervention. During the
Wars of the Roses and under the Tudors, absolutist monarchs did
resort to the expedient of putting down civil disturbances with military force; but legal scholars of that period and of our own agree
that those monarchs' actions were in violation of the law of the land.'
What had been suffered under the Tudors was to cause revolution
under the Stuarts. When Charles in 1627 sent military troops instead
of relying on the civilian posse comitatus to suppress riots in several
towns, Parliament postponed all its other business to prepare, under

a more detailed discussion and documentation of this history, see Engdahl, Soldiers,
Riots and Revolution: The 1aw and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1971).
'Magna Carta, c. 39 (1215).
4 THOMAS EARL OF LANCASTER'S CASE IN 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 343-46 (1st Am.
2 For

ed. 1947); EDMUND EARL OF KENT'S CASE, IN HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW

40-41 (2d ed. 1716); see also Supra note 2 at 5-6.
55 Rich. 2, stat. 1, e- 5 (1381).
6 13 Hen. 4, c. 7 (1411); see also Supra note 2 at 8.
7 See F. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 266-68 (1908).
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the leadership of the former Chief Justice Lord Coke, the Petition of
Right of 1628. That historic document declared that the practice of
dealing with riots by military means was "wholly and directly contrary to the said laws and statutes of this your realm."' Later, in his
landmark Institutes of the Laws of England, Coke elaborated upon
this thesis, and added that for a soldier to kill a civilian under a claim
of military authority, at a time when civilian courts were open, would
be murder. 9 When Charles persisted in employing military measures
to solve domestic problems even after the Petition of Right, it led
directly to revolution and the execution of the King.' After the Restoration, the principle that military measures must never be employed domestically so long as the civilian institutions of the law
remain operable was reiterated by Lord Chief Justice Hale, and
12
reconfirmed by enactment of the 1689 Bill of Rights.
When England was beset with scattered riots and disturbances
in protest of the Hanoverian succession in 1714, Parliament enacted
a new riot act to correct the defects which the developments of three
centuries had created in the old. Just like the 1411 statute, however,
the 1714 riot act provided for suppressing riots by the posse comitatus
under the control and command of the ordinary local civilian officers,
and contained not a hint of any authorization for the use of military
troops to suppress any civil disorder, however aggravated the circumstances might be.13 This was no mere accident, but rather a confirmation of what the struggles of the seventeenth century had reaffirmed
as a fundamental precept of due process of law. Blackstone, writing
on the eve of American independence, ratified this fundamental doctrine ;14 and his restatement served to punctuate the colonists' assertion of their heritage of due process.
The colonial charter reflected the struggle in England over military troops and civil disorders during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 15 The explicit provisions of those charters, together
with an acute awareness of the due process tradition, explain why
the colonists were so incensed when General Gage repeatedly employed military troops to suppress disorders in the colonies. The
tragedy at Boston on March 5, 1770, became known as the Boston
Massacre and served as the catalyst for revolution, not because the
unruly mob that was fired upon was innocent or worthy of any praise,
but because the employment of military troops against even a riotous
' 3 Car. 1, c.1, §8.
'COKE,

THIRD INSTITUTE, c. vii, at 52; FOURTH INSTITUTE, c. xvii.

"1Stipranote 2 at 10-14.
11HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 39-40 (2d
121 W. & Mary, sess. 2, c. 2 (1689). Supra note 2.

ed. 1716).

131 Geo. 1, stat. 2, c. 5 (1714).
141 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE JAWS OF ENGLAND 400 (1765).

75Supra note 2 at 18-22.
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assembly found no warrant in the Massachusetts Charter and was a
brazen affront to the colonists' claim of the right to be treated, as
Englishmen, in accord with the principles of due process of law. 16
Continued use of military troops to suppress colonial disorders,
as well as related militaristic measures, fueled the rising fires of discontent until independence was declared in 1776. As they had done
before in resolutions of colonial legislatures and in acts of their
Continental Congress, the patriots charged in their Declaration of
Independence that the King had "affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power," and had contrived to
exempt from trial and punishment British troops accused of "mur7
dering" disorderly colonists under color of military authority. The
constitutions and bills of rights enacted during the revolutionary era
by the newly independent states contained provisions which, when
viewed against this background, appear deliberately tailored to
guarantee that military steps would not be used to deal with domestic emergencies so long as civilian institutions were capable of
functioning.18
A crucial development in the law occurred in England in 1780.
A major riot in London, lasting several days, was finally suppressed
by the use of soldiers. Afterwards the members of Parliament heatedly
debated whether this was not a violation of the principle just discussed. The view which prevailed was that which was articulated by
Lord Chief Justice Mansfield. Mansfield's doctrine acknowledged that
riots were to be suppressed only by civilian officers and the posse
comitatus, and never by military force. He pointed out, however,
that the same persons who were members of the army were also
members of the posse, which included all able-bodied men of age;
and he concluded that, regardless whether they happened to wear
army uniforms or not, they could be called upon to suppress a riot
"not as soldiers, but as citizens."" The critical point was that when
employed to suppress a riot the members of the armed forces acted
in their capacity as members of the civilian posse, and not at all as
soldiers, and were therefore subject to civilian law and civilian command exactly like any other citizen called to aid a sheriff or other
civilian official. Only on this view could the use of "soldiers" to suppress a civil disorder be reconciled with the historic principle of due

16Supra note 2 at 21-25.

17Swpra note 2 at 26-28.
"Smpra note 2 at 28-31.
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 688-98. An account of the 1780 riots,
together with major excerpts from Lord Mansfield's speech, is printed in 3 CAMPBELL,

"21

THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 421-31 (1831).
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Mansfield doctrine was promptly applied judiprocess of law.20 This
21
cially in England.
A careful review of the records of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, the congressional preparation of the
Bill of Rights, and the legislation of the first sessions of Congress
concerning the army and the militia discloses unmistakably that the
traditional prohibition against using military troops in civil disorders, as adapted by the Mansfield doctrine, was well understood and
was consciously and deliberately preserved as inherent in the concept of due process of law. 22 Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, both state militiamen and members of the national
armed forces were occasionally employed as an auxiliary peace force
to enforce the law or restore order; but it was clearly understood that
when so employed they were essentially civilians, not soldiers, and
were subject to control by local civilian officials and governed by the
rules of civilian law. They were in fact conceived of as members of
the civilian posse." Soldiers were held personally liable for official
acts they committed against civilians in violation of civilian laws,
4
even though they acted under military orders. 2 The Supreme Court
of Louisiana branded as "preposterous" the notion that a military
commander could exercise any authority in derogation of the local
civilian law and its officials. 25 The Attorney General of the United
States, explaining the practice in 1854, made specific reference to
Lord Mansfield's doctrine that members of the armed forces could
be used not as soldiers but as civilians, as members of the civilian
6
posse comitatus, in domestic law enforcement situations. This
familiar practice even formed the basis of the misunderstanding
to send
that President Buchanan used as an excuse for refusing
27
troops into the South on the eve of the Civil War.
Abraham Lincoln avoided Buchanan's error, but erred on the
other side. It was Lincoln who reintroduced into America the habit
of using military force against civilians even while civilian institutions could function3 The United States Supreme Court and other

2t

Supra note 2 at 31-35.

Rex v. Kennett, 172 Eng. Rep. 976, 984 (K. B. 1781); Rex v. Finney, 172 Eng. Rep.
962, 967 n. (b) (Spec. Comm'n, 1832).
zSupra note 2 at 35-49, n. 23, 24.
3
' See United States v. Stewart, 27 F. Cas. 1339, 1342-43 (No. 16401a) (Crim. Ct. D. C.
1857); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass, 121, 142 (Sup- Jud. Ct., Norfolk County, 1855).
'Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 330, 337 (1806); Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns. 522
(S. Ct. of Jud. N.Y. 1814); McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234, 235-38 (S. Ct. of
Jud. N.Y. 1815); Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257, 266 (S. Ct. of Jud. N.Y. 1815).
'Johnson v.Duncan, 3 Martin 530 (La. 1815).
51

2 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466 (1854).
"Supra note 2 at 52-53.
2
Supra note 2 at 53-54.
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courts, as rapidly as cases could reach them, declared that Lincoln's
employment of military force in those states where local civilian governments were operable was utterly unconstitutional and incompatible
with due process of law?

The resolute judicial insistence upon due process of law, however, was not enough to prevent the surge of militaristic sentiment
accompanying the Civil War from having its effect. Military governments were created to reconstruct the South, even where civilian
post-war governments were already in operation; and old federal
statutes were amended and new ones enacted to facilitate expanded
use of military troops to control civil disorders. 0 Effective judicial
denunciation of these developments was brazenly choked off by the
radicals in Congress and, although the courts continued to reiterate

the settled anti-militaristic principle of due process whenever they had
occasion to do so,31 the reconstructionists saved their militaristic
schemes from wholesale invalidation by shamelessly manipulating

the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.3
By the mid-1870's, the violence of a homeland war and the experience of soldiers serving on their own soil in an avowedly military

capacity had caused the notion that troops could be employed domestically only as civilians under civilian officers and laws to become

obscured." Repeated instances of military displacement of civilian
officials and intimidation of citizens became a national scandal, which
by 1878 produced a congressional response; but since the Senators
and Representatives

themselves so imperfectly recalled the due

process principle and the practice of using military troops "not as
soldiers, but as citizens" in civil disorders, the act which they passed
in 1878 actually served to further obscure in the public mind the

principle that had been so vigorously and consistently followed until
the Civil War.Y

29Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-25 (1866); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266,
296-98 (1578); Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380, 381 (No. 9605) (C.C.D. Ind. 1871);
Johnson v. Jones, 44 111. 142 (1867); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863).
31The statutes are examined in Part 1, Engdahl "The Legislative History," of the Law
Revision Center, A Comprehensive Study of the Use of Military Troops in Civil Disorders,
With Proposals for Legislative Reform, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. at 399-420 (1972); Supra
note 2 at 55-62.
"See e.g. Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266 (1878); Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 716
(1875); Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (No. 9605) (C.C.D. Ind. 1871); McCall v.
McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1.235 (No. 8673) (C.C.D, Cal, 1867); McLaughlin v. Green,
50 Miss. 453 (1874); In Re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367 (No. 4303) (C.C. N.D. N.Y. 1866).
"See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
"The use of troops in their character as soldiers in the rebel states during the duration of
hostilities was certainly compatible with the traditional due process principle. Familiarity
with their employment in that context, however, conditioned the country to tolerate their
use in other contexts as well, where their use could not be squared with the traditional rule.
3 See "The Legislative History" supra note 30.
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Courts, with their commitment to authority and precedent, were
somewhat slower to forget the traditional rules of due process governing the domestic employment of military troops than the political
branches of the state and federal governments were. Thus, for example, a Pennsylvania court held in 1898 that in the event of a riot
"[t]he sheriff may avail himself of the services of military organizations. He may order them into his posse, not as soldiers, but as
citizens, trained and disciplined for effective service in critical emergencies."" And even more notable, in light of the tragedy at Kent
State University in Ohio in 1970, is the instruction of an Ohio trial
judge instructing a jury in accordance with the traditional due process
principle in a case in 1897. The judge explained that a National Guard
colonel and his regiment called to help enforce the laws could
act as an armed police only, subject to the absolute and exclusive control and direction of the magistrates and other
civil officers designated in the statutes, as to the specific
duty or service which they are to perform; nor can the sheriff
or magistrate delegate his authority to the military force
which he summons to his aid, or vest in the military authorities any discretionary power, to take any step or do any
act to prevent or suppress a mob or riot.36
The United States Supreme Court itself in 1932 took note of the traditional due process rule, affirming the holding of a three-judge District Court that conditions of violence, disorder, and riot are only
"breaches of the peace, to be suppressed by the militia as a civil
force," and not by uniquely military force.37 By far the majority of
state and lower federal courts which have had occasion to face the
issue during the twentieth century have instinctively recoiled from
the assertion that military force is permissible in domestic law enforcement situations. 38
There have been some cases, however, in which judges have lost
sight of the traditional rules in this area as completely as the political
branches have. 39 The most significant of these cases, because it is
always claimed as controlling authority by those who seek to justify
military force and discretion in the control of disorders, is Moyer v.
Peabody.40 What the Court held in Moyer 'v. Peabody was that in the
event of insurrection military troops could be used "as soldiers." If
by insurrection was meant an avowed armed assault which had suc3sCommonwealth v. Martin, 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 219, 224 (1898).

36State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62, 63 (Pickaway, C.P. 1897).
37Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 391 (1932), quoting from Ccntanfin v. Smith, 57

F. 2d 227, 231 (F.D.Tem. 1932).
8

3 Supra note 2 at 67-70.

3"Supra note 2 at 65-67 note 318.
40212

U.S. 78 (1909).
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ceeded in disabling the established institutions of government, as
distinguished from a mere riot or civil disorder, this holding would
not have lacked precedent. 41 But Moyer v. Peabody also held that the
governor's determination that an insurrection existed was conclusive.
Under that rule a governor could declare a mere riot or even a potential disorder to be an "insurrection" and thus by verbal sleightof-hand justify its suppression by military force. Thus, in effect, the
Court in Moyer gave carte blanche approval to military force for suppression of civil disorders, in the uncontrolled discretion of the
executive.
The Court's opinion in Moyer v. Peabody was written by Justice
Holmes - a circumstance which has tended unwarrantably to magnify the significance of the case. Always less thoughtful and perceptive as the voice of a majority than when the dialectic of dissent
brought his mental skills to their peak, Holmes casually endorsed a
position in Moyer to which he himself, after further reflection, was
unable to adhere.42 And in 1932 the proposition of Moyer, that the
executive could determine with finality whether the circumstances
justifying military force and suspension of civilian law and authority were present, was directly overruled.4
In a second respect, as well, Moyer has been flatly overruled.
Moyer held that when an "insurrection" existed normal due process
standards were relaxed or suspended so that persons could be jailed
or shot in good faith but "without sufficient reason.'"" In Sterling v.
Constantin, however, the Court reviewed the facts behind the Moyer
litigation, and instead of crediting the allegation of the Moyer pleadings that there was no sufficient reason, declared that "In that case
it appeared that the action of the Governor had direct relation to the
subduing of the insurrection . . .- 45 Having thus radically restated
the facts of Moyer, so as to supply reasonable grounds for those acts
of the governor which the Moyer Court had presumed to be without
reason, the Sterling Court warned that the "general language" of the
Moyer opinion "must be taken in connection with" the restated facts
of the case. 46 Consequently, since Sterling v. Constantin was decided,
41Sapra note 2 at 49-50.

Holmes recognized that the final decision cannot be left to a political branch on a
question of "emergency" that determines the scope of the branch's own power. Although
the dtclaratiun of a legislature as to present exigencies is entitled to respect, Holmes wrote
for the Court in 1924, "a court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake,
when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared." Chastleton v.
Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924).
43In Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), the Governor of Texas had declared
certain counties to be in a state of insurrection, and thereupon had invoked martial law.
The Court reviewed the facts of the situation, found no genuine insurrection to have
been present and held the Governor's declaration and ensuing actions void.
4212 U.S. 78, 83-85.
45287 U.S. 378, 400.
42

4Id.
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in 1932, Moyer v. Peabody has been no authority for governmental
acts unsupported by sufficient reason, even in a situation of "insurrection"; and a fortiori, Moyer is no authority whatsoever for any
relaxation of the ordinary standards of civilian due process for governmental action in the event of a riot or a civil disorder not approaching an "insurrection."
In a series of recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has
vindicated the ancient anti-militaristic principle of due process by
restricting the "judicial" power of the military over civilians. 7 The
principle which underlies these recent cases is exactly the same historic principle of due process that forbids the use of soldiers under
military commanders and military law and discipline as an "executive" force to enforce civilian law and preserve or restore order.
Summary of the Due Process Principle
It is characteristic of due process principles that they have a
content and application clear from their history but not easily reduced
to simple statement in a phrase or a few sentences. The major features of the seven-centuries old due process rule governing the use
of military troops in domestic situations, which the reader would find
very fully elaborated and confirmed if he were to go to the sources
referred to in the foregoing brief account, may be summarized for
our present purposes as follows:
1. Military troops may be used as soldiers - as a uniquely military force - only in those extremely rare and highly exceptional
circumstances where civil authority has been incapacitated, whether
by foreign attack or domestic rebellion (i.e., genuine insurrection).
The traditional criterion for determining whether military force
could be used was whether the courts of law were closed. This criterion dates back to the time when judges along with the rest of the
king's officials and advisors would join him in going off to war, so
that the courts could be open for their regular business of administering the civilian law only when the realm was at peace." The
traditional test - whether the courts are closed - has been adopted
in American law." For modern times the closure of the courts is not
T
1 Relford v. Commandant, 401 US 355 (1971); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S.
278 (1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1

(1957) ; Toth N.Quarles, 350 U.S. It (1955).
48Supra note 4.
4' E.g Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1863); Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. 2d 227 (E.D. Tex. 1932); Middleton v. Denhardt,
261 Ky. 134, 87 S. W. 2d. 139 (1935); Seaney v. State, 188 Miss. 367, 194 So. 913
(1940); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924); Ex Parte
McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914); Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162
Okla. 216, 19 P. 2d 582 (1933); Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D.
Minn. 19)9); Faubus v- United States, 254 F. 2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973

9

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:3

a very satisfactory criterion: modern judges do not ride off to war
with their king; an unruly assembly which occupies a courthouse
may be no more serious threat to civil government than one which
occupies the executive or legislative chambers or a university building or a city street; and it is generally held that a judge does not
lose his power or ability to function merely because his chambers or
courtrooms are closed. It would better preserve the substance of
the traditional criterion if one were to inquire whether civilian executive force could effectively enforce the civilian laws, including
such orders as a civilian court might issue. In any event, military
troops cannot be used as soldiers on the mere pretext that civilian
peace forces are overtaxed or undermanned; for all of the manpower
available from the National Guard or other military forces is available to be used as a force of civilians under civilian command and
under civilian law and limitations. To pass from ordinary civilian
peace forces directly to military troops in their military character,
neglecting the possibility of using the military personnel as a supplementary civilian force, is to overlook the entire law and history
of domestic use of military troops in the due process tradition.
2. Whether circumstances warrant the domestic employment
of military personnel in their character as soldiers is a question that
will of course have to be determined in the first instance by the chief
executive, either of a state or, in appropriate cases, of the nation.
This is not the same as determining whether military troops are to
be used at all. So far as due process is concerned, a state is free to
utilize whatever civilian force it might choose for whatever purposes it might choose, so long as the state respects the sundry rights
of the people. So long as the force used is essentially civilian, it is
entirely a matter of non-constitutional and normally state law
whether and under what circumstances members of military organizations are to be employed to subdue riots or disorders, police disaster areas, perform rescue services, collect garbage, operate utilities,
or perform any other function. The only time that the due process
safeguard against military oppression comes into play as a limitation
on the chief executive's power to utilize military troops, is when the
executive contemplates the utilization of those troops as a military, rather than as a civilian, force. Because exigencies calling for
uniquely military force, exceedingly rare as they are, do not ordinarily allow for more, in advance, than informed unilateral executive action, the initial determination whether uniquely military action
is warranted must rest necessarily with the executive. The cases,
however, make no point more clear than that this determination by
the executive is subject to review by the judiciary; while some lati50For an example of the unsatisfactory results to which a technical application of the traditional criterion, without regard to its substance or purpose, can lead, see Valdez v. Black,
446 F. 2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971), cort. denied, 405 U.S. 963 (1972).
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tude is allowed for judgment on the part of the executive, the ultimate
determination of the issue whether military as distinguished from
civilian force was warranted must always be made independently by
the courts. 1 In other words, in determining to employ military personnel as a military rather than a civilian force, the executive acts
at his peril.
3. One of the two factors that has served to distinguish between a civilian and a military force since at least the thirteenth
century is the officers who have the rights and responsibilities of
command. Due process regards military personnel as a civilian force
only so long as the ordinary local civilian officers who would have
borne responsibility had the troops not been employed remain in
command. The requirement of military subordination to civilian
power is not satisfied by merely designating the civilian chief executive the "commander-in-chief." Neither is it permissible to assign a
military officer a general task and trust to his discretion for the
means of accomplishing that task, As one Ohio judge correctly stated
the rule, the troops, if they are to be regarded as a civilian force,
are under the "absolute and exclusive control and direction" of the
local civil officers, and the sheriff or other officials cannot delegate
any of their authority to, or vest any discretionary power in, any
military authorities.52 At an earlier day, even the question whether to
use military troops at all as a civilian force had been entirely in the
discretion of the local officials themselves; the federal legislation of
187853 and comparable developments in most of the states have given
chief executives control over the decision whether military troops as
a civilian force will be used at all, but this gives the chief executives
no power to authorize the use of troops without complete subordination to local civilian officials. Such subordination to the local officials
remains a due process imperative except where civilian government
has failed, and troops can lawfully be employed as a uniquely military force.
4. The other historic factor distinguishing between a civilian
and a military force is the law by which the members of the force
are governed. Military troops employed in any domestic situation,
whether riot, disorder, disaster, catastrophy, or whatever, can be
regarded as a civilian force only so long as civilian law continues to
govern not only the citizenry but the troops themselves. Military
troops employed as a civilian force are subject to the same standards
of behavior as civilian peace forces or civilians assisting the ordinary
peace forces, and are subject to subsequent civilian judicial review

57See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400-02 (1932),

and Supra note 2 at 67, n. 319.

"Supra, note 36.
3Sspra, note 34.
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of their actions. They cannot be judged by the rules of, or subjected
to the sanctions of, military law including the Uniform Code of Military Justice; nor can they be excused for their actions because those
actions comport with military standards of self-defense or unflinching obedience to orders. Like civilians officers, they must be held to
act at their peril under a standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances.
This summary statement of the main tenets of the due process
tradition concerning military troops in civil disorders provides an
adequate background for reviewing the facts culminating in the
tragic shooting at Kent State University on May 4, 1970.
It should be noted at the outset, before looking at the particular
facts of that tragedy, that in the light of the due process principles
outlined above the statutes under which Ohio National Guard troops
are currently used in civil disorders are in several respects unconstitutional on their face. Ohio Revised Code §§5923.24 and 5923.26
enacted in 1953 conflict with due process insofar as they provide that
troops on duty in civil disorders (as distinguished from genuine insurrections) are subject to the discipline of military law and courtsmartial. Ohio Revised Code §5923.23, also enacted in 1953, conflicts
with due process and with the rule which Ohio earlier had respected,
by providing that although military commanders should consult with
civil authorities as to the general objects to be accomplished, "the
mode and means of execution shall be left to the discretion of the commanding officer." And Ohio Revised Code §5923.37, enacted in 1967,
creates a generous and unconstitutional special immunity exclusively for military troops, which, unlike the immunity conferred
equally upon civilian and military personnel by Ohio Revised Code
§2923.55, is not limited to acts which are reasonably "necessary and
proper" to subduing the disorder. The 1967 statute purports to give
a special immunity exclusively to military troops for acts which cannot satisfy the test of reason, so long as they are not acts of "willful
or wanton misconduct."
Article I, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution contains the same
language inserted in several of the original state Constitutions after
the Revolution of 1776, which was designed to constitutionalize the
common law rule. It provides that the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. But apparently the real significance
of this provision has been completely forgotten, and legislators in
Ohio mistakenly believe that it is satisfied by simply keeping the
civilian governor as commander-in-chief.
The Kent State Tragedy
Since the facts of the Kent tragedy have not yet been subjected
to judicial trial, the nearest that one can come to an authoritative
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss1/5
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objective assessment of what happened is the Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest. The account which follows is
a condensation of the Commission's account,s emphasizing the facts
that have particular significance to the legal points.
Northeastern Ohio late in April, 1970, was beset with wildcat
trucker strikes. To deal with striker violence, the Governor on April
29 issued a proclamation calling out the National Guard. That proclamation mentioned seven counties of the state by name; Portage
County, the location of Kent, was not one of those specified. The text
of the April 29 proclamation is reproduced below.5" Several things
are notable about this proclamation. Although the preamble recited
that sheriffs and police had proved "unable with their own forces to
bring about a cessation of violence," and that "the Mayors of many
Ohio cities . . . have urgently requested" National Guard aid, these
findings had to do with the truck strike disturbances, not with any
anticipated campus unrest. Furthermore, while the military forces
were to "act in aid of the civil authorities," the import of this was
apparently not that the guardsmen should act as subordinate civilian
peace officers, but rather merely that the military commanders should
"consult with [the civil authorities] to the extent necessary to determine the objects to be accomplished"; notwithstanding the rules of
due process which had been recognized in Ohio at an earlier day,5'
it was specifically provided that "the procedure of execution" was
to be left to "the discretion of the commanding military officer designated by the Adjutant General." No control over the discretion of
the military officers was reserved by the proclamation even to the
Governor himself; the Adjutant General was left free to designate
whatever and however many units he chose, and in his own discretion "to take action necessary for the restoration of order throughout
the State of Ohio." When a few days later the language, "throughout
the State," was given application to localities as to which no formal

233-290 (1970),
WHEREAS, in northeastern Ohio, particularly in the counties of Cuyahoga, Mahoning,
Summit and Lorain, and in other parts of Ohio, in particular Richland, Butler and
Hamilton Counties, there exist unlawful assemblies and roving bodies of men acting with
intent to commit felony and to do violence to person or property in disregard of the laws
of the State of Ohio and the United States or America, and
WHEREAS, said unlawful assemblies and bodies of men have by acts of intimidation
and threats of violence put law abiding citizens in fear of pursuing their normal vocations
in the transportation industry; and
WHEREAS, local government officials, including sheriffs and their deputies and
municipal police departments, are unable with their own forces to bring about a cessation
of violence and reduce the believability of threats of violence; and
WHEREAS, troops of the Ohio National Guard, in coordination with the Ohio
State Highway Patrol and local peace officers, can bring about a restoration of confidence
in ability of citizens to move freely in the conduct of their business over the streets and
highways of the State; and

5U.S.

55

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST, REPORT,

(Continued on next page)
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finding of civilian incapacity had been made, the tremendous scope
of this purported abandonment of civilian power into military hands
was underscored.
While the Ohio National Guard was on duty for the truckers'

strikes, the President's war policy in Southeast Asia took a dramatic
new turn. On the night of April 30, the President announced that he
had ordered United States troops into Cambodia. The daylight hours
of May 1 at Kent State were marked only by some peaceful protest
assemblies; but that evening a series of incidents more or less related to unhappiness over the new turn in war policy produced about
$10,000 in property damage to about 15 business buildings in downtown Kent, some minor property damage on the University campus,

two police injuries from rocks or other missiles, and 15 arrests. During the night, at the request of the Mayor of Kent, a National Guard
liaison officer was sent to survey the situation in Kent, but no mili-

tary troops were authorized or sent.
On May 2, among several other steps taken to prevent a recurrence of violence and disorder, an injunction was procured against

damage or destruction of buildings or other property. There was no
injunction, however, against assemblies or rallies, a fact that was

specifically pointed out in leaflets distributed on the University campus by University officials. Late in the afternoon of May 2, in the
face of rumored new violence, the Mayor of Kent telephoned the

Governor's office with a request for National Guard assistance. The
jurisdiction of the Mayor of the City of Kent over the campus of
Kent State University is dubious at best. City police in Kent regarded
the campus as outside their jurisdiction, and subject to the Univer-

WHEREAS, the Mayors of many Ohio cities, after taking counsel with each other,
have urgently requested that the Governor make available the troops of the Ohio National
Guard to assist in maintaining order, and in restoring freedom of transportation movement,
NOW, THEREFORE, I, JAMES A. RHODES, Governor and commander-in-chief
of the militia of the State of Ohio, do hereby order into active service such personnel and
units of the militia as may be designated by the Adjutant General to maintain peace and
order and to protect life and property throughout the State of Ohio; and said Adjutant
General, and through him the commanding officer of any organization of such militia, is
authorized and ordered to take action necessary for the restoration of order throughout
the State of Ohio. The military forces involved will act in aid of the civil authorities and
shall consult with them to the extent nessary to determine the objects to be accomplished,
leaving the procedure of execution to the discretion of the commanding military officer
designated by the Adjutant General.
The Adjutant General shall provide all transportation, services, and supplies necessary
for tie militia, and all statutory provisions requiring advertisement for bids in relation to
their procurement are hereby suspended.
I command all persons engaged in riotous and unlawful proceedings to cease and
desist from such activities.
The active military duty herein ordered is hereby designated as service in a time of
public danger.
This proclamation shall continue in force until revoked.
6
5 Supra note 36.
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sity's campus police. The University officials privy to the Mayor's
request for the National Guard were under the impression that the
Guard was being requested for duty only in the city of Kent and not
on the Kent State campus. No University official ever requested National Guard assistance, on that day or on any other.
Considering the language of his April 29 proclamation, "throughout the State of Ohio," to be adequate to cover the Kent situation, the
Governor verbally authorized the commitment of guardsmen to Kent
57
without any written proclamation. Guardsmen bivouaced at Akron,
ten miles from Kent, were placed on standby. In the evening on May
2, a crowd growing to about 1,000 persons gathered on the campus,
and after a short while moved toward the ROTC building. No effort
was made by the campus police or any other civilian forces to prevent persons in the crowd from stoning or otherwise damaging the
ROTC building. Even after the building had been set afire, no police
were deployed until after firemen had arrived and been forced to
withdraw. Only then did the campus police appear, using tear gas
to drive the crowd away from the burning ROTC building, Meanwhile, a few minutes before the ROTC fire had been started, the
Mayor of Kent (but no University official) had secured the dispatch
of the alerted National Guardsmen into Kent.
Upon arriving in Kent and conferring with the Mayor, but
without consulting with or requesting or receiving permission from
any University official, the Adjutant General of Ohio sent National
Guard troops onto the campus. By midnight, without benefit of any
request or instructions from University officials, the National Guard
had cleared the campus with tear gas, and held it secure.
On the morning of May 3 the Governor arrived in Kent, and held
a news conference in which he vehemently denounced campus violence
and pledged to "eradicate the problem." After two hours the Governor left, having done nothing to resolve the uncertainties about
applicable rules and relative authority that still had the various
civilian officials and peace forces confused. The University officials,
in particular, concluded that their authority had been preempted,
and abdicated to the National Guard, passing on to the University
community their own understanding that all assemblies had now been
banned, not by University or City officials, but by the National Guard
or the Governor as commander-in-chief. That evening, at about 9
p.m., the National Guard dispersed a crowd from the Campus Commons, and after two hours of ensuing non-violent demonstrations, a

57

A post facto proclamation covering Kent and the Kent State University campus was issued
three days later, on May 5, after the Guard had been present there for more than two days
and after the tragedy of May 4 had already occurred.
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half-hour of rock throwing, tear gas, minor injuries and arrests
ended the day. That is the factual background of May 4.
May 4 was a Monday. Classes were scheduled and held as
usual. Both at the University and in the City of Kent, the ordinary
functioning of institutions was unimpaired. The courts were open
and operating, and city as well as University officials performed their
duties without interference. No buildings or public places were
occupied or obstructed. Yet all was not like normal; the campus was
being patrolled by armed military troops.
There still had not been any request or invitation from University officials for assistance or protection by the National Guard.
The University president believed his authority had been superseded, and he simply resigned himself to the Guard's control. As the
morning advanced, plans for a noon rally were rumored around the
campus. No local civilian authority had forbidden such a rally, but
the National Guard commander determined that it should be banned.
By about 11:45 a.m., about 500 persons had gathered on the Campus
Commons. No acts of violence had taken place. No speakers were
inciting the crowd. No unlawful intent was apparent in the assembly.
The Adjutant General nevertheless order the crowd dispersed.
The troops were ordered to "lock and load" their weapons thus
chambering ammunition ready to fire. A University policeman riding
with riflemen in a National Guard jeep approached the crowd to
order it to disperse, and some rock throwing and chanting began.
A few hundred more students by now had joined the crowd, and the
Guardsmen, fixing baynets and firing tear gas, began to move them
out. For the next thirty minutes, tear gas and epithets, and occasionally rocks, filled the air. One group of the guardsmen drove a
part of the crowd past the administration building and down a hill
to a parking lot adjoining a football practice field. For about ten
minutes the guardsmen remained on the practice field, separated from
the parking lot by a high chain link fence. Rocks and tear gas cannisters flew back and forth. At one point the members of Cavalry
Troop G huddled in an apparent conference; at another point they
knelt and aimed their rifles at the crowd. After about ten minutes on
the practice field, the guardsmen were ordered by the Adjutant General to return up the hill. As they did so, the men of Troop G lagged
and fell out of formation as they looked back over their shoulders at
the dwindling parking lot crowd. At the crest of the hill, several
members of Troop G turned in unison approximately 135 degrees,
retraced a few steps, and began to fire. Other guardsmen then turned
and joined in the fusilade. The thirteen-second barrage of more than
60 shots was concentrated in the parking lot, more than 100 yards
away. Some of those killed or injured had been participants in the
violent disorder that had followed the commander's decision to dis-
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perse the noon assembly; others had been bystanding observers; still
others were mere hapless passers-by.
In its Report on Kent State the President's Commission on
Campus Unrest refrained from detailing certain of the facts for fear
of interfering with the criminal prosecutions which were expected
to ensue. When more than a year passed without any federal prosecutorial action, the Chairman and several other members of the Commission became some of the most outspoken critics of the delay. The
Justice Department's own summary of the evidence compiled by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which evidence had been made
available to the Commission, helps to explain the Commissioners'
criticism. Among the conclusions contained in the Justice Department
Summary were the following ."
(1) Just prior to the time the Guard left its position
on the practice field, members of Troop G [107th Armoured
Cavalry] were ordered to kneel and aim their weapons at
the students in the parking lot south of Prentice Hall. They
did so, but did not fire. One person, however, probably an
officer, at this point did fire a pistol in the air ...
The Guard was then ordered to regroup and move back up
the hill past Taylor Hall.
(2) The crowd on top of the hill parted as the Guard advanced and allowed it to pass through, apparently without
resistance. When the Guard reached the crest of Blanket Hill
by the southeast corner of Taylor Hall at about 12:25 p.m.,
they faced the students following them and fired their
weapons. Four students were killed and nine were wounded.
(3) Six Guardsmen, including two sergeants and Captain
Srp of Troop G stated pointedly that the lives of the members of the Guard were not in danger and that it was not a
shooting situation.
(4) We have some reason to believe that the claim by the
National Guard that their lives were endangered by the
students was fabricated subsequent to the event. The apparent volunteering by some Guardsmen of the fact that
their lives were not in danger gives rise to some suspicions.

A copy of the Justice Department Summary was given by Jerris Leonard, head of the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, to Senator Stephen Young of Ohio.
Young referred to the Summary on serveral occasions in statements on the floor of the
Senate during the fall and winter of 1970, and the Summary was then published in full
(without Justice Department approval) as Chapter 4 of STONE, THE KILLINGS AT KENT
STATE: How MURDER WENT UNPUNISHED (1971).
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[One guardsman] admitted that his life was not in
(5)
danger and that he fired indiscriminately into the crowd. He
further stated that the Guardsmen had gotten together after
the shooting and decided to fabricate the story that they
were in danger of serious bodily harm or death from the
students.
(6) Also, a chaplain of Troop G spoke with many members of the National Guard and stated that they were unable to explain to him why they fired their weapons.
No verbal warning was given to the students immedi(7)
ately prior to the time the Guardsmen fired.
(8) There was no request by any Guardsmen that teargas
be used.
(9) There was no request from any Guardsmen for permission to fire his weapon.
(10)

The Guardsmen were not surrounded.

(11) No Guardsman claims he was hit with rocks immediately prior to the firing.
(12)

There was no sniper.

(13) The FBI has conducted an extensive search and has
found nothing to indicate that any person other than a
Guardsman fired a weapon.
(14) At the time of the shooting, the National-Guard
clearly did not believe that they were being fired upon.
(15)

Each person who admits firing into the crowd has

some degree of experience in riot control. None are novices.
(16) A minimum of 54 shots were fired by a minimum of
29 of the 78 members of the National Guard at Taylor Hall
in the space of approximately 11 seconds.
(17) Five persons interviewed in Troop G, the group of
Guardsmen closest to Taylor Hall, admit firing a total of
eight shots into the crowd or at a specific student.
(18) Some Guardsmen (unknown as yet) had to be
physically restrained from continuing to fire their weapons.
(19) Four students were killed, nine others were wounded,
three seriously. Of the students who were killed, Jeff Miller's body was found 85-90 yards from the Guard, Allison
Krause fell about 110 yards away. William Sehroeder and
Sandy Scheuer were approximately 130 yards away from
the Guard when they were shot.
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(20)
Although both Miller and Krause had probably been
in the front ranks of the demonstrators initially, neither
was in a position to pose even a remote danger to the National Guard at the time of the firing. Sandy Scheuer, as best
as we can determine, was on her way to a speech therapy
class. We do not know whether Schroeder participated in
any way in the confrontation that day.
(21) No person shot was closer than 20 yards from the
guardsmen. One injured person was 37 yards away; another, 75 yards; another 95 or 100 yards; another 110 yards;
another 125 or 130 yards; another 160 yards, and the other,
245 or 250 yards.
(22)
Seven students were shot from the side and four
were shot from the rear.
Of the 13 Kent State students shot, none, so far as
(23)
we know, were associated with either the disruption in
Kent on Friday night, May 1, 1970, or the burning of the
ROTC building on Saturday, May 2, 1970.
(24) As far as we have been able to determine, Schroeder,
Scheuer, Cleary, MacKenzie, Russell and Wrentmore were
merely spectators to the confrontation.
Aftermath of the Kent State Tragedy
After the shootings, National Guard and state officials were
quick to offer justification. Many of the residents of northeast Ohio,
who had seen and heard broadcast reports of the preceding days'
violence, took the view that the students had gotten what they deserved. On the other hand, the Vice President of the United States
let slip the opinion that the shootings constituted at least second degree murder ;9 but his opinion seems to have carried no more than
its accustomed weight. More comprehensive investigations, however,
confirmed the view that the guardsmen had committed a serious
wrong. The President's Commission on Campus Unrest, after an exhaustive set of hearings and studies concluded that the shooting was
"unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable. 60 The FBI, conducting
its own investigation, concluded that there were grounds for criminal
charges against at least six of the guardsmen. 61 None of the incriminating evidence, however, was laid before the state grand jury
convened to review the days of disorder, and that grand jury accord5 David Frost television show, May 7, 1970; Pretrial transcript appears as Appendix II in
STONE, THE KILLINGS AT KENT STATE (1971).

' 5 Supra note 54 at 289.
6JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT

SUMMARY

OF F.B.I.

INVESTIGATION,

as

reported

in

Akron

Beacon Journal, July 23, 1970.
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ingly exonerated the guardsmen while indicting a number of students
and faculty. (The state grand jury's report was expunged by federal
court order 62 and the indictments were later dismissed for lack of
evidence.) No federal grand jury has even been convened to investigate the incident. 3
The offenses with which some of the guardsmen might be
charged include not only homicide and assault under Ohio law, but
also criminal offenses under the Federal Civil Rights Acts. Some persons have suggested that the huddle of Troop G on the football practice field, that same Troop's demeanor on the return march up the
hill, and the turning and firing in unison by several members of
Troop G, as if on a signal, suggest a conspiracy in violation of 42
U.S.C. §241." Announcing his refusal after fifteen months to place
the matter before a federal grand jury, the Attorney General of the
United States opined that there was "no credible evidence of a conspiracy" ;A but he said nothing at that time or at any other time to
explain his opinion, or to explain how, regardless of any conspiracy,
the facts could fail to be seen as a probable violation of 42 U.S.C.
§242." Violation of that section, where death results, is a federal
felony.
The Boston Massacre, on facts showing somewhat greater immediate danger to the military troops, resulted in prompt prosecutions by colonial authorities and the conviction and punishment of
the principal soldiers involved on charges of manslaughter. In contrast, the Kent shootings have not even been brought before a grand
jury. Instead, the research files of the President's Commission on
Campus Unrest, as well as the full F.B.I. investigatory report, have
been sealed in the National Archives, cut off from any inquiry for a

6 Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 afi'd, 450 F. 2d 480,

63A suit was filed Oct. 12, 1972, in an effort to compel a federal grand jury investigation.
Schroeder, et al. v Kleindienst, Civ. Action No. 2048-72 (D. D. C.)
"See Davies, An Appeal for Justice, printed in 117 Cong. Rec. at F8144-E8158 (daily ed.,
July 22, 1971). 18 U.S.C. §241 provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, or because of his
having so exercised the same ...
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or life.
65STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN N. MITCHELL, released by the Justice Department August 13, 1971.
6618 U.S.C. §242 provides
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any Stare, Territory or District to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Coustitution or laws of the United States, . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results, they shall be

subject to imprisonment for any term of years or life.
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period longer than the life expectancy of most persons now alive."
Even more clearly than they contain criminal implications, however, the apparent facts of the Kent State tragedy give rise to civil
claims; and the inability of the aggrieved persons after almost three
years of diligent efforts to even get a hearing on their allegations
in a civil court is an even more disturbing commentary upon contemporary American justice and the inefficacy of the criminal law.
They are referred to here only to emphasize the different grounds
on which redress is being sought. Ohio, by a statute enacted in 1967,"
purports to protect National Guardsmen from civil suit in state courts
for acts performed on duty in a disorder "unless the act is one of
willful or wanton misconduct." As to actions in federal courts under
42 U.S.C. §198369 the leading case law affords the guardsmen a personal privilege for acts done in good faith and with reasonable belief
10
in the existence of probable cause. The complaints in the several
actions brought against the guardsmen implicated at Kent are taillored to surmount these defenses as a matter of pleading, and the
attorneys for the plaintiffs are satisfied that they can sustain their
burden of proof. But these defenses, even if they were established,
would not negate the unlawfulness of the acts which were done. Even
if it were impossible to prove allegations that the shootings at Kent
State amounted to willful and wanton misconduct, or even to prove
bad faith or the lack of reasonable belief in probable cause, a grave
and unrequited wrong would still have been done.

6718 U.S.C. §4 provides:
Under 5 U.S.C. §555 (c), even F.B.I. investigative files cannot be withheld
from Congress except on a claim of executive privilege. Nevertheless, without
attemping to invoke executive privilege, two successive Attorneys General have
denied repeated requests of a United States Senate Subcommittee during 1971
and 1972 seeking access to the Kent State F.B.I. report.
Whoever, having knowledge uf the actual commission of a felony cognizable
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under
the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both. Obstructions by National Guard officials of investigation have
been charged, which arguably constitute violations of this section. Moreover,
the national administration seems to have taken care to keep the facts of the Kent
matter concealed. While the latter is probably not indictable under 18 U.S.C. §4,
that statute's existence does emphasise the gravity with which the concealing of
crimes should be viewed.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5923.37 (Page Supp. 1970).
1142 U.S.C. §1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
"Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F. 2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
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The official lawlessness that proximately caused the gunshot
deaths and injuries at Kent was not merely the bad faith or malicious
conduct of a few armed soldiers; the lawlessness to which the whole
tragedy is primarily attributable was the utter disregard of the rules
of due process for the use of military troops in civil disorders. The
guardsmen at Kent State presented and comported themselves as a
superseding military force. Civilian authority abdicated its control.
No local civilian officer asserted the prerogatives of command. The
Governor's proclamation by its terms unlawfully provided that "the
procedure of execution" of the general objectives to be accomplished
were left "to the discretion of the commanding military officer.. ."'
It was the military commander's decision, not that of any civil officer,
that forbade and dispersed the peaceful noon assembly on May 4,
triggering the disorder that resulted in the shootings. The troops
were under the regime of military law and orders, and their weapons
as well as their tactics were appropriate to a militarily occupied
zone. Yet by no colorable pretense were those rare and extreme facts
presented which would justify the displacement of civil by military
authority and force.
It is this that gives the tragedy of Kent State a significance far
greater than any simple act of official vindictiveness under color of
law. It is this that makes Kent a model of exactly the kind of military
suppression of civil disorders that the historic principle of due process
forbids. And yet, ironically, this most flagrant violation of the most
ancient traditions of due process has thus far eluded all attempts
at redress.
The traditional device in American law for redressing unlawful
or unconstitutional positive acts by the state has been personal suit
for damages against the officer who performed the act on the state's
behalf. However, the statutory and case law rules of official privilege
referred to earlier,2 which have come to flourish in the last very few
years, have transformed this traditional remedy for governmental
wrongdoing into little more than a remedy for personal wrongdoing
by persons masquerading in the role of the state. The gradual course
of this profound transformation in the doctrine that once was the
guarantor of enforcible constitutional limitations is much to complicated to reiterate here; it is traced in another comprehensive article
recently published. 73 It is sufficient here to note that, because of the

Supra note 55.
72Supra notes 66 and 68.
71

7"

Egdahl, immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrcngs, 44 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1 (1972).
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modern personal official privilege rules, it is no longer possible, as

it formerly was, 4 to obtain redress against officers personally for their
unconstitutional official actions despite good faith, reason, and commendable intent.
Since not only problems of proof but also practical problems of
jury persuasion under the modern rules of personal official privilege

are difficult obstacles to surmount, the attorneys for the Kent State
plaintiffs have supplemented their actions against the principal officers personally with actions directly against the State of Ohio. Here,

of course, they confront the familiar barrier of soverign immunity.
Some of the arguments by which they propose to surmount that
barrier, however, are not likely to be found familiar to many lawyers
at all. Those arguments are treated elsewhere in this symposium.

It may be that, as important as the vindication of the due
process principle governing the use of military troops in civil disorders certainly is, the greatest significance of the Kent State litigation will be its illumination of the crisis that recent changes in official
privilege doctrine have unwittingly created. If a notorious violation

of the deepest traditions of due process can go without redress, and
without even an opportunity for hearing, then the concept of enforcible and effective legal restraints upon government has encountered
a great crisis indeed.

"4 See e.g. Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1878); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 126, 137 (1851); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46 (1849);
Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 1235 (C. C. D. Cal. 1867); McLaughlin v. Green, 50
Miss. 453, 461-63 (1874); Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142, 92 Am. Dec. 159 (1867);
Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863); Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. 1815);
McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234 (N.Y. 1815); STORY, COMMENTARIES ON AGENCY
320 (5th ed. 1857); see also United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 627-28
(1871); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (Cranch) 330 (1806). The same liability attached
to the officer who acted under orders but in violation of a statute, as distinguished from
the Constitution, see e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Hyde v.
Melvin, II Johns. 521 (N.Y. 1814).
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